later on a reorganized Eighth Army could stand and fight. The sight of this terrain was of little comfort to a soldier commanding a mechanized army…I flew on to Seoul, to the advance CP, to find to my great disappointment only a handful of officers there. The others were back at Taegu, two hundred miles from the fronta situation I resolved to remedy at once.
Matthew B. Ridgway
Few men are vouchsafed the command of armies; fewer still face the task of rebuilding defeated armies in wartime, and of these only a handful have been successful. Three who assumed command in the midst of defeat were George McClellan, arriving in Washington, D.C., to take over the Army of the Potomac as it licked its wounds after Bull Run; William Slim, coming to Burma as the Japanese drove the British out of Rangoon; and Matthew Ridgway, appointed to lead an Eighth Army reeling back before the Chinese pouring over the Yalu River.
Each one of this trio led forces either recently defeated or in headlong retreat. Each one found himself in a fundamentally changed strategic situation, with armies ill designed for their allotted tasks. Thus, they faced the monumental challenge of averting catastrophe while transforming their commands into instruments of victory.
As will be seen, McClellan, Slim, and Ridgway differed considerably in tactical acumen, command style, personality, and level of combat experience. Each effected the transformation of their respective commands differently. Nevertheless, a close study of their methods reveals remarkably common approaches to the problem, and point the way for an army seeking to 'grow' transformational leaders -leaders who are masters of the science, art, and craft of war.
Their ability to use traditional indicators of effectiveness to rapidly assess their commands' condition, and to discern the critical problems vice the transitory within a transformed environment -the science of war -laid the foundation for ultimate success. Building upon that foundation required of each an intuitive grasp of the art of war, allowing them to formulate a vision of future operations based on their prior experience and their understanding of war's basic principles. Finally, each possessed the master craftsman's talent for adapting theory to the material at hand, the capacity to make an abstract vision concrete.
George McClellan took a demoralized army of short-term volunteers run by amateur generals and turned it into the professional force that ultimately (and long after he passed from the scene) became the juggernaut that ground down the Confederacy. He recognized the falsity of expectations that the war would amount to a military promenade to Richmond, and established the logistic, administrative, and qualitative preconditions for victory. It is true that he lacked the ability to lead his creation -though he never lost a battle he was constitutionally incapable of winning a campaign -but the operational tempo of his times allowed him to employ his considerable organizational talents unmolested by the enemy. what lay just outside their picket lines; other than a few regular regiments, most of his units were untrained and ignorant of the basics of camp life; the few prepared positions were poorly constructed, ill-sited, and isolated. But it was his human material that concerned him the most, "a collection of undisciplined, ill-officered, and uninstructed men, who were, as a rule much demoralized." 1 McClellan was thirty-four years old as he galloped about Washington and its environs. It had been just fourteen years since his graduation from West Point, only four since he had resigned as a captain to take up a career in the railroad industry. However, his ten years of service had been particularly beneficial in preparing him for his new role. As a distinguished young engineer officer during the Mexican War, McClellan had campaigned in an Army part volunteer and part regular. That war left him with a firm understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of volunteer regiments and their green officers. He served on the staff of America's greatest general, Winfield Scott, from whom he gained an understanding of army organization and administration. He distilled these lessons through the next seven years of semiindependent command and regimental service. Then, in 1855, the bright young captain was afforded an extraordinary opportunity. Dispatched to Europe to observe the Crimean War,
McClellan traveled throughout the continent, a grand tour of the world's most advanced armies.
His book-length report, published in 1861, while innocent of any deep theorizing, reflected
McClellan's keen insight into the minutiae of military organizations.
2 Upon his return from Europe, unable to face the stultifying prospect of garrison life, he left the Army.
McClellan was not without his faults. Though vigorous and handsome, the self-confidence he exuded masked a bone-deep indecisiveness. As one of his business associates commented, "he can never make up his mind under two or three weeks on any matter and when he has made it up, is by no means certain about his decision." 3 Four years in the railroad business, however, had not dimmed his memory of how a successful army operated, or of the contrast between America's volunteers and the professionals of Europe.
McClellan also brought to Washington a flawed but essentially correct vision of how the Union defeat at Bull Run had changed the strategic situation -and of the type of army required to win the war. In an appreciation submitted to the president, written less than a week after assuming command, McClellan wrote:
We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists...of the utter impossibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent battle (Manassas) it is possible that we might have been spared the labor and expense of a great effort; now we have no alternative...The contest began with a class, now it is with a people...
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McClellan estimated that this great task would require an army of 273,000, trained, equipped, and organized along modern lines. Though it may seem unremarkable in hindsight, his proposal envisioned a radical break with American military tradition -an army of volunteers, ten times larger than any yet seen on the continent, trained to the standards of regulars.
Instead of a mammoth army of well-trained soldiers, McClellan possessed perhaps 50,000 men, many with their enlistments about to expire. Thousands more were being mobilized throughout the north, but adding them to a demoralized (and in some cases mutinous) mob 
The conscious charismatic
In addition to his formidable organizational skills, the "Young Napoleon" earned his sobriquet. In a romantic age, he consciously strove to inspire his troops. Always immaculately uniformed, the handsome young general took every opportunity to show himself to the army, riding through camps, tracing the picket lines, and holding numerous reviews. These forays, of course, served as a means of inspection, but they also "let the men see me and gain confidence in me." 13 A superb horseman, McClellan never failed to impress as he galloped past astride his giant steed, hat in hand, stern eagle-eye searching out every fault. To an army of green soldiers, he personified the popular image of the model major general. According to the chaplain of the 1st Minnesota, "his presence is greeted with the enthusiasm that the soldiers of France always exhibited toward Napoleon."
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McClellan matched his physical gifts with a quiet, gentlemanly demeanor finely attuned to the temper of the age. Though he privately seethed against his enemies, real and imagined, and was often subject to fits of childish pique, he usually confined his feelings to his extensive correspondence with his wife. In camp, he freely encouraged the approach of enlisted men and officers, courteously hearing their complaints and exercising the power of his public persona.
As one of his aides recalled, "he knew how to inspire others with an absolute devotion." there. This faith remained steadfast through years of defeat, bearing fruit at Gettysburg, in the Wilderness, and beyond; meanwhile, the army's "absolute devotion" to its Young Napoleon long survived his departure from command. appreciation for the art of the possible, and a firm grasp of the importance of maneuver in a war without fronts.
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Now he was entering unfamiliar territory. By his own admission, he was ignorant of both Burma and the Japanese, and none too familiar with jungle warfare. 18 It may have been just as well that he did not know what he was getting into. BurCorps had already suffered considerable losses in the war's opening clashes. The headquarters had been, before the war, strictly administrative, and had neither the kit nor the training to properly conduct operations. When
Slim found it, it had 60 personnel, four wireless sets, no messing section, rudimentary furnishings, and precious little office equipment. The operations section owned 2 motorcycles, 2 jeeps, and a single truck. 19 There was no intelligence network, amidst a population that was apathetic when not outright hostile, and communications were spotty at best. equipment and its seriously wounded. After a further withdrawal to a subsequent position, the process repeated itself. There was no questioning the resolve of the Commonwealth troops, but inevitably the army began to regard their Japanese opponents as supermen, uniquely fitted to warfare in the jungled hills.
Slim instinctively sought to strike back at the Japanese, but the exhaustion of his troops, the desperate state of his road-bound supply columns, and the press of events frustrated his plans. In some cases Slim probably asked too much of his men. His own assessment of his performance is possibly the frankest ever recorded in a general's memoirs:
For myself, I had little to be proud of; I could not rate my generalship high. The only test of generalship is success, and I had succeeded in nothing I had attempted. Time and again I had tried to pass to the offensive and to regain the initiative and every time I had seen my house of cards fall down as I tried to add its crowning storey...In preparation, in execution, in strategy, and in tactics we had been worsted, and we had paid the penalty -defeat.
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This self-excoriation is unwarranted. Slim was a talented tactician, learning rapidly in a hopeless situation. On at least three occasions he saved his corps from utter annihilation. At army, only a few thousand men remained capable of resistance. It was a barefoot column, dressed in rags, with little more than small arms and the ammunition carried on the men's backs. Even after reaching sanctuary, the army continued to lose hundreds each day to malaria and dysentery. BurCorps could only muster ten artillery pieces, fourteen mountain guns, four anti-tank guns, 50 trucks and 30 jeeps, all "badly in need of maintenance." 24 As for Slim, despite his unflappable demeanor, the strain had been considerable: he abandoned plans to grow a beard when it came out snow white. 
Transforming on a shoestring
With BurCorps deactivated, Slim was assigned command of its replacement, XV Corps, and eventually rose to command 14th Army, responsible for the bulk of operations in Eastern India and Burma. In the months ahead, despite distractions in the form of civil unrest and minor operations in the Arakan region, Slim remained focused on preparing his command for the eventual liberation of Burma. 26 He outlined his assessment of the recent campaign in a 'lessons learned' memorandum issued to XV Corps units:
(i) The individual soldier must learn, by living, moving, and exercising in it, that the jungle is neither impenetrable nor unfriendly...
(ii) Patrolling is the master key to jungle fighting...
(iii) All units must get used to having Japanese parties in their rear, and, when this happens, regard not themselves, but the Japanese, as 'surrounded'. (viii) If the Japanese are allowed to hold the initiative they are formidable. When we have it, they are confused and easy to kill. By mobility away from roads, surprise, and offensive action we must regain and keep the initiative.
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In essence, Slim envisioned the type of army needed to defeat the Japanese. Absolutely at the bottom of the Allies' priority list, Slim and his men would largely be left to their own devices as they transformed their way of waging war.
Slim's overhaul of his army aimed at providing his headquarters with the means to command and control dispersed, continuous operations; creating an intelligence network capable of tracking Japanese movements; enabling tactical mobility through mastery of the terrain; and translating tactical to operational mobility by strengthening (or in some cases, creating) the mechanics of resupply. The methods used to achieve these goals ranged from straightforward to strikingly innovative -if somewhat inelegant.
Slim started with his own headquarters. Besides weeding out the unfit, subjecting the remainder to grueling road marches, field problems, and marksmanship training, Slim and his small cadre of veterans worked to make the outfit a true operational headquarters. The emphasis was on mobility. Everything, from furniture to map boards to office supplies, was designed to be packed away in sling-mounted footlockers. These could be transported by truck, plane, boat, mule, or porter. Constant drill and strict adherence to load plans allowed the headquarters to displace in a truly remarkable twenty minutes.
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In order to correct the crippling lack of operational intelligence, Slim borrowed a technique used to good effect throughout Britain's colonial wars. Slim never entirely solved his logistical problem. It remained a source of constant anxiety throughout the war. Nevertheless, he overcame the problems of terrain through a combination of ruthless efficiency, innovation, and improvisation -at least to the point where he had established a relative superiority in operational mobility vis a vis his Japanese counterpart.
As a first step, European standards were quickly abandoned. "We discovered that," Slim wrote later, "instead of the four hundred tons a day not considered excessive to keep a division fighting in more generous theaters, we could maintain our Indian divisions in action for long periods...on one hundred and twenty." 33 As reinforcements arrived, the bulk of their transport was stripped from them and centralized. Any gear not absolutely essential to fighting was relegated to depots in Eastern India. This entailed considerable hardship for the fighting men, especially the English troops, and a reduction in firepower -Slim freely admits that muscle was sliced away with the fat -but it allowed his divisions unparalleled powers of movement across difficult terrain. Organizations, and typically accompanied leading elements into combat. Slim's troops became masters at the art of cutting a hasty airstrip into the jungle, or of putting a captured airfield back into operation. Standard loads were devised, refined, and tailored for specific operations, so that every planeload delivered supplies with maximum efficiency. By the time of Slim's drive on Rangoon, his army combined ground and air maneuver by hop scotching around and over a confused Japanese foe from one airhead to another -all, it must be added, without the use of specially trained troops or elite airborne formations, or indeed with enough airplanes in hand.
As Slim put it:
A feature of our airborne operations and movements was that the troops employed were not of some special kind. No soldiers...were taught to believe there was anything mystic, strange, or unusual about air movements or maintenance; to them, of whatever race, these were normal administrative methods...we were undoubtedly the most air-minded army that ever existed. We had to be.
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Slim's comments on air transport encapsulate the secret of his success in Burma.
Hamstrung by insufficient resources, he adapted the tools at hand, improvised when necessary, and accepted risk where he had to. Provided with units that, at best, required extensive acclimatization to a new environment, and, at worst, consisted of raw conscripts, he focused their training on those skills most critical to the Burmese battlefield. As reinforcements trickled in, he indoctrinated them in his idiosyncratic methods and quickly made them contributing members of the team. In short, he formulated a vision of how to beat the Japanese and then refused to allow the multitude of obstacles, shortcomings, and handicaps to divert him from achieving his aims. He tailored his means to his ends, rather than the other way around, as a lesser man might -but a lesser man could not have transformed the army that drove the Japanese out of Burma.
But even allowing for Slim's superb improvisational skills and his keen tactical acumen, perhaps his greatest achievement was in convincing the men who served with him that victory was not only possible, but inevitable. Despite the beating they took in 1942 and the initial impression of the Japanese as jungle-savvy supermen, despite the manifest material shortages, the Rube Goldberg logistical system, and the neglect of a home front focused on other theaters, Slim infused an army that eventually grew to eighteen divisions with the force of his own confidence and enthusiasm. Partly this was the result of hard and relevant training, always a morale booster with men destined for combat. Mostly, though, it was the result of an unconsciously charismatic man conscientiously applying basic tenets of leadership.
The unconscious charismatic
Slim used the hardships of the retreat to forge a remarkable bond with his men -though 'use' perhaps connotes a degree of conscious manipulation foreign to Slim's nature. Certainly
Slim understood that a leader must show himself, share the rigors of campaigning, and demonstrate a degree of confidence he may not, in his heart, possess. But he did not purposefully play to his audience in the way McClellan did. Indeed, that was part of his appeal.
To his troops, he was the antithesis of the reserved, aristocratic officer who may have earned their respect but rarely their affection. His ability to connect with the common soldier without seeming to pander touched a chord across a great range of ethnicities.
36 Slim, pp. 544-545.
The British soldiers in Burma recognized Slim as one of their own. It was common knowledge that he was from the lower middle class and not a product of Sandhurst; a persistent myth arose that he had enlisted as a private in 1914. The average Tommy of that period gave short shrift to officers who consciously tried to appear common when they were not -it was Slim's great gift to be comfortable in his own skin, and yet able to command respect. One soldier records his first impression of the general:
He was wearing an ordinary army issue topi, without embellishment, an illpressed khaki bush-shirt without medal ribbons, and a pair of khaki slacks that looked as if he had slept in them (which he probably had)...He did not have Alex's panache, nor Monty's fire, but he impressed by his evident integrity, the absence of any kind of 'stuffiness', and by the warmth of his personality.
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His experience in India helped, of course. He understood the needs, both physical and emotional, of his multi-national force. He had commanded Gurkha and Indian troops, knew how they had been trained and what they were capable of. He spoke a number of subcontinent languages, allowing him greater familiarity with men of indubitably alien cultures. But it was his human touch that inspired soldiers with that most precious commodity -faith that the commander understood his business and would ask of them what was necessary, but no more.
"When speaking in English, Gurkhali, Urdu, or Pushtu," one officer observed, "it was always as one man to another -never the great commander to his troops...He was human, but never soft -far from it...He was a great leader -true; he was a great commander -true; but to us he was, above all, the well-loved friend of the family." 38 A captain on Slim's staff provided an example of the unconscious mannerisms that meant so much to an army in the midst of defeat.
"Throughout the retreat, when speaking on the wireless Slim always began 'This is Bill speaking.' To me, at any rate, 'Bill speaking' at a time of crisis was psychologically superb, for it breathed friendship, not necessarily avuncular!"
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Though he tirelessly preached to units, headquarters, and small groups encountered in motor pools, canteens, and along jungle trails, Slim could not spread himself thin enough to reach the entire army. He did press hard -by his own calculation one-third of his time was spent on visits -but he did not exhaust himself. Beset by hemorrhoids, prostate problems, recurring bouts of 'Delhi belly' and malaria, Slim set himself a schedule meant to preserve his physical and mental powers. Except during crises, he rose at 0600, often took a three-hour break at lunchtime or in the afternoon, finished his work in the early evening and retired promptly at 2200. 40 Thus, he pressed his commanders into service as his proxies, first ensuring to "unite them in a common approach to the problem, in the points that they would stress, and in the action they would take to see that principles became action not merely words." 41 In modern parlance, he formulated an information campaign, tirelessly prosecuted it, and made sure that his subordinates stayed on message.
The commanders and their staffs found it easy to spread the gospel because they themselves believed it, a result of Slim's collective approach to problem solving.
Commander's conferences were not unlike postgraduate university seminars, with Slim as chairman, guiding but not dominating discussion. His technique was to say very little until the end, when he would summarise the discussion, analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the various arguments. He welcomed disagreement, even when he felt the arguments were unsound; the only thing he would not tolerate was mindless, sycophantic agreement with his point of view.
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The simply incompetent or those unable or unwilling to 'buy in' were ruthlessly removed, the remainder enjoying Slim's unwavering trust. "These were officers who could go to Slim informally after a meeting and say 'Bill, I think you're making a howling cock of such and such.'" 43 In such an environment, it is little wonder that his subordinates could faithfully and honestly reinforce his spiritual exhortations.
Slim also saw to it that the confidence of the army was built by small successes. As units were introduced to the battlefront, its best men and officers were sent out on patrol. The hard training outlined earlier invariably resulted in minor triumphs:
These patrols came back to their regiments with stories of success, of how the Japanese had walked into their ambushes, how they had watched the enemy place their observation posts day after day in the same place, and then had pounced on them, how they had followed their patrols and caught them asleep. Our men brought back a Japanese rifle, an officer's shoulder-straps, a steel helmet.
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New men went out under experienced leaders, reinforcing and spreading "that individual feeling of superiority and that first essential in the fighting man -the desire to close with his enemy." 45 Gradually, the confidence cultivated by such operations was translated into (and strengthened by) success at battalion, brigade, and division. Once faith in victory grew, the As a leader of elite airborne soldiers, Ridgway's wartime experience (at least until the final months, when his corps became, for all practical purposes, airborne in name only) was unusual compared to his peers. It was, first of all, episodic in nature, with the airborne undergoing severe trials followed by rotation out of the firing line to prepare for the next jump. Secondly, though Ridgway led exceedingly tough, well-trained troops, they were often outclassed by the enemy in terms of firepower, armor, mobility, and supply -certainly a unique situation for most American commanders. Finally, Ridgway learned his trade in the odd rhythm of airborne operations: punctilious, detailed planning followed by utter chaos that the commander could only overcome through personal effort and force of personality. They were lessons that would stand him in good stead in Korea. goose egg on the map, with the number 174,000 scrawled inside. Logistical officers had stopped shipping ammunition forward, considering that it was wasted effort in light of further expected withdrawals.
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Ridgway spent the first few days in Korea visiting every U.S. Corps and Division in Eighth
Army by light plane, helicopter, and jeep. He found that 'bug out' fever had infected the army from top to bottom. At each command post he visited he discovered "the same sense of lost confidence and lack of spirit." 53 The former paratrooper was most dismayed by the funk he perceived in the ranks, an attitude greatly at odds with the army he remembered in the last war.
"I could read it in their eyes, in their walk. I could read it in their faces...They were unresponsive, reluctant to talk. I had to drag information out of them." 54 Even gripes had to be pried loose by direct interrogation, a sure sign to the old soldier of demoralization.
And there was plenty to gripe about. One unit complained they had been abandoned in the rout, another had no winter clothing issue, still others had no envelopes, or had lost their mess tents. The root cause of their distress, however, was clear: a solid month of retreat. They had simultaneously lost faith in the competency of their leaders and grown fearful of the enemy.
Many Americans considered the Chinese soldier a superman, inured to the weather, heedless of casualties, master of infiltration and camouflage. For weeks on end Eighth Army had fallen back to one line after another, only to see it turned, penetrated, or bypassed. Few men knew why they were fighting in Korea, anyway; fewer still were prepared to die for it.
Though he never showed it, Ridgway himself was shaken. On 29 December, he supported in writing MacArthur's proposal to use Nationalist Chinese to invade southern China, seeing it as the only way to relieve pressure on the hard-pressed U.N. forces in Korea.
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Shortly thereafter, with evidence mounting that the Chinese were about to resume the attack, he "put aside the hope I had entertained before...of offensive action to inflict losses and gain the initiative." 56 But Ridgway's natural pugnaciousness soon reasserted itself. The ex-paratrooper certainly had fought and won before against uneven odds, and if he grudgingly admired the Chinese as superb infantry, he also instinctively understood their vulnerabilities. Furthermore, guidance from the Joint Chiefs arrived in late December that may have steeled his resolve.
We believe that Korea is not the place to fight a major war. Further, we believe that we should not commit our remaining available ground forces to action against Chinese Communist forces in Korea in face of the increased threat of general war. However, a successful resistance to Chinese-North Korean aggression at some position in Korea...would be of great importance to our national interest, if [it] could be accomplished without incurring serious losses.
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Though he does not refer to this message in his memoirs, it must have crystallized Ridgway's thinking. There would be no reinforcements arriving, and little tolerance for heavy losses -but neither was their any specific territorial goal, beyond sustained resistance "at some position." Ridgway had his mission.
Micromanaging to Victory
With his theoretical understanding of the situation in Korea leavened by an on-the-ground assessment, Ridgway concluded that further withdrawal was unavoidable. For one thing, nearly three-quarters of his divisions were still refitting or in transit from the beating they had taken on the eastern half of the peninsula; for another, the South Koreans on his right flank remained extremely shaky. When the Chinese attacked in early January, Seoul had to be abandoned again, along with most positions north of the Han River. The lull that fell over the front in midJanuary resulted more from Chinese physical and logistical exhaustion than from any efforts of Eighth Army.
Throughout those critical two weeks, Ridgway literally camped in I Corps headquarters, the unit bearing the brunt of the fighting as the rest of Eighth Army arrived to firm up the line. In his account of the war, Ridgway charitably claims he did so for "logistical" reasons, but the hard fact was that it was the best place for him to exercise direct control over operations. Collins, who departed from a front-line visit on 17 January firmly convinced that "morale was fine" and that Ridgway's current position was "impregnable."
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By that time, Eighth Army had already undertaken a few minor counterattacks. A week later they began a general offensive that Ridgway characterized as "a phased advance under Army control." The purpose of the advance was not to gain ground.
It remained the infliction of maximum damage on the enemy with minimum to ourselves, the maintaining of all major units intact, and a careful avoidance of being sucked into an enemy trap -by ruse or as a result of our own aggressiveness -to be destroyed piecemeal. We were to pursue only to the point where we were still able to provide powerful support or at least manage a timely disengagement and local withdrawal. 
Consciously Uncharismatic
There is a picture extant of Ridgway on his first day in Korea. command": renewing the faith of the common soldier while challenging the professionalism of his officers. 68 Ridgway always insisted the first aid pouch and grenade were practical accoutrements, but it is hard to believe that he did not understand their dramatic effect. He liked to roar up in his jeep, dismount before it had stopped rolling, and gather together as many men as he could for an impromptu bitch session. He normally started by "telling them that they had to pull up their socks. There was nothing wrong with them...and no reason they could not win." 69 He then listened to their complaints, sampled their food, and inspected their positions with a gimlet eye.
As soon as he pulled out, he set his aides and staff officers to resolve whatever problems had come to his attention, raising hell himself if necessary. Nor did he confine himself to major issues. Ridgway frankly admits that "I concerned myself with petty matters, too," 70 such as ordering the bedsheet muslin and chipped crockery in the general's mess replaced with fine linen and china, or directing the delivery of olive oil to homesick Greek troops. 71 These huddles of freezing men had a magic effect on morale. When, two days after Ridgway promised help, trucks pulled up full of parkas and winter boots for the 24th Infantry, or helicopters landed with stationery for a hospital unit, the soldiers of Eighth Army concluded that they had a commander who not only looked like them but genuinely empathized with their plight, and -a critical point for the modern American soldier -was competent enough to actually deliver on his promises. If one accepts that technological acceleration and the globalization of American interests will create an environment of continual transformation, can we grow transformational leadersor at least identify those most likely to adapt well to change?
One aspect of the issue, based on the three case studies, seems to be counter-intuitive:
to fit or select a leader for transformation, make sure he understands the nuts and bolts of his profession. Unless a leader possesses an intuitive and deep understanding of the machinery of war, he will be unable to reassemble it in useful form, or apply it in innovative ways when circumstances require. Likewise, the necessary skill of rapid and accurate assessment presuppose familiarity with traditional indicators -the metrics of both combat and organizational effectiveness.
Transformational leaders, by definition required to discard conventional (and safe)
solutions, require a self-confidence bordering on hubris. It is probably not a coincidence that all three of our exemplars served extensively in dusty, isolated garrisons for much of their careers, shouldering heavy responsibilities far from the flagpole. It is true that McClellan's confidence faded quickly on the edge of the battlefield, but the celebrated young general never doubted his organizational abilities.
Finally, the act of transformation requires communication -in many forms -in order to synchronize the efforts of the multitude along a single axis. To do so, the leader must not only be able to express himself clearly -it is no accident that McClellan, Ridgway, and Slim all wrote classic memoirs without the aid of ghostwriters -he must be in touch with the culture of his command, instinctively attuned to the proper motivational strings to tug on in the midst of unsettling change.
The practical implications of these observations seem clear. To widen the pool from which to select transformational leaders, maximize time spent in the modern equivalent of 'regimental service'; create opportunities (even in the information age) for independent command; place heavier responsibilities (and concomitant powers) on junior leaders; and train them to write and speak clearly -no easy task in an age of e-mail and bulletized slides.
Promotion should depend on demonstrated skill at problem solving, assessment, and communication; admission to higher military education should be through standardized testing along European lines -perhaps even making it possible to fail once enrolled. 
